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Sometimes, the line between trade promotion and trade protection is a fuzzy 
one. This is especially true in the automobile industry. For example, in an ap- 
parent effort to induce Japan to buy more US. cars and car parts, the United 
States recently threatened  100 percent tariffs on a handful of Japanese luxury 
cars. Trade promotion or trade protection? 
The debate on U.S.-Japan trade promotion and trade protection in the auto- 
mobile industry is frequently heated and pitched. The goal of this paper is to 
make sense of the sequence of recent events in which the United States devel- 
oped a large bilateral trade deficit in automobile parts with Japan, which then 
led to the threatened tariffs on Japanese luxury cars, which in turn led to Japa- 
nese promises to buy more U.S. parts. Along the way, some of the questions 
addressed are the following: What are the root causes of the U.S. trade deficit 
in automobile parts? Why did the United States target thirteen luxury cars pro- 
duced by Japan instead of a more broadly based tariff or a tariff on automobile 
parts? How would the profits of  domestic, Japanese, and European firms have 
been affected by the proposed 100 percent tariff? How much of the tax burden 
would have been borne by  U.S. consumers  and how much by  the Japanese 
firms? Readers should note, however, that this paper does not attempt to re- 
solve the “big-picture’’ issue of  how closed the Japanese automobile market 
may be. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 addresses the question of how 
the United States and Japan came to the brink of a trade war in the summer of 
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1995. This section discusses how structural differences in the U.S. and Japa- 
nese automobile parts industries may have contributed to trade frictions. Sec- 
tion  1.2 analyzes the logic (such as it was) that led from the parts dispute to 
the  threatened  tariff.  Section  1.3 analyzes  the  likely  consequences  of  the 
threatened tariff using a detailed econometric model of industry equilibrium. 
Conclusions are gathered in section I .4. 
1.1  Trade Promotion and Trade Protection in the 1990s: 
How Did We  Get to Where We Are? 
Trying to understand the sequence of events that led to the threatened  100 
percent tariffs  on thirteen Japanese luxury  cars is tricky business, for logic, 
analysis, and common  sense will get one only so far. On the  surface, what 
began as a dispute about how many parts the Japanese should buy from U.S. 
parts manufacturers led to a threatened tariff on Japanese luxury cars and re- 
sulted, in the end, in Japanese promises to buy more U.S. parts. How was it 
that these events came to pass? 
The very notion that trade in automobile parts could lead to a major trade 
dispute is indicative of the large changes the automobile industry has under- 
gone in the last ten years. Not that long ago, Japanese cars were made in Japan, 
and American cars were made in the United States. Suppliers to the assemblers 
were located close to the assembly factories as transport costs mattered. U.S. 
assemblers dealt mostly with US.  parts manufacturers, and the same was true 
in Japan. There simply was not a lot of international trade in automobile parts. 
By the mid- 1980s, the volume of trade began to increase. Table 1. I gives the 
U.S.-Japan trade balance in automobile parts for 1985-94.  In that period, the 
U.S.-Japan  bilateral trade deficit in automobile parts went from about $3 bil- 
lion to almost $13 billion. This section discusses the role that industry structure 
might have played in explaining the figures in table 1. I. 
Table 1.1  U.S.-Japan Trade in Automobile Parts, 1985-94  (in $million) 
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1.1.  I  Industry Structure in the United States and Japan 
The relations between  assemblers and their parts suppliers differed  in the 
United States and Japan, and this is largely a product of history. The ways in 
which they differed have important implications for the deficit observed in the 
later years in table 1.1. 
First, consider the structure  of  the US. automobile parts industry. In  the 
United States, there was a long history of vertical integration in the automobile 
industry. At one extreme was Henry Ford’s River Rouge plant, where it was 
loosely claimed that iron ore went in one end and cars came out the other. 
While the three U.S. automobile manufacturers have moved from this extreme, 
the industry is still quite vertically integrated. Consequently, many parts are 
still supplied by in-house suppliers. 
At  least until  recently, the U.S. assemblers’  relations  with their  suppliers 
were, at best, complicated.  As explained in more detail in Womack, Jones, and 
Roos (1990), U.S. assemblers frequently supplied their potential parts manu- 
facturers with detailed  specifications of  a particular  part and then took bids 
based on price for a specified quantity. This emphasis on price did little to 
encourage capital investment and, especially, research and development by the 
suppliers. The emphasis on price is also sometimes claimed to have negatively 
affected the quality of contracted parts. Future price adjustments and negotia- 
tions were standard, and the ensuing relation was seldom one of cooperation. 
U.S. firms also purchased imported parts, and this practice was facilitated by 
stockpiling parts inventories. That is, in order to insure against parts becoming 
unavailable, U.S.  firms would keep hefty  inventories of parts.  Hence,  while 
transport costs would add to the cost of an imported part, the delays inherent 
in international  shipping were not likely to be terribly costly, for inventories 
were available to buffer these delays. All these practices are changing, but un- 
derstanding them helps explain some of the current issues in the automobile 
parts dispute. 
The relation between Japanese automobile assemblers and their parts suppli- 
ers differs from the traditional relation in the U.S. industry. Japanese automo- 
bile assemblers are reputed to have developed a more long-term relation with 
their suppliers. The reasons for this are many, but they are due in part to histori- 
cal as well as economic influences. Following World War 11,  Japanese auto- 
makers had a series of sequential decisions to make. They needed to decide 
whether to source parts domestically  or through imports. Owing to stringent 
exchange controls and rules on imports following the war, they chose the for- 
mer option. They then needed to decide whether to make their parts themselves 
or buy from outside sources. They chose not to adopt the U.S. pattern of verti- 
cal integration, this was probably due in part to the scarcity of capital following 
the war, in part to the lower wage structure that was prevalent among the parts 
suppliers, and in part to a strategy to lower investment risks (by limiting verti- 
cal integration, less capital was at risk). 14  James Levinsohn 
Japanese OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) next needed to decide 
whether  to  seek  either  stable  or floating  relations  with  their  suppliers and 
whether to make these relationships exclusive. When the Japanese OEMs real- 
ized their great dependence on outside suppliers, they anticipated several po- 
tential difficulties. First, some of their suppliers had a low level of technologi- 
cal competence. Second, with too many suppliers, any one supplier would have 
difficulty achieving economies of scale. Third, the cost of policing the OEM- 
supplier relation  might  be  formidable.  Certain  criteria  were  established  for 
suppliers. For example, potential suppliers were closely examined with regard 
to their reliability,  financial  soundness,  and  capacity  to learn the necessary 
technology quickly. Also, the relations with suppliers had to last long enough 
to justify the large expenses encountered while screening different suppliers. 
Finally, the technological assistance and actual technology given to the sup- 
plier had to be kept out of the hands of rivals. These criteria led to the develop- 
ment of  long-term  exclusive relations  with parts  suppliers. For purposes  of 
comparison, it is estimated that in  1987 a Japanese OEM would, on average, 
deal directly with two to three hundred parts makers (not including materials 
and equipment makers), while a comparable number for General Motors was 
in the range of up to thirty-five hundred (Mitsubishi Research Institute 1987). 
The resulting structure of the parts industry in Japan resembled a pyramid 
in which the OEM was on the top, followed by first-tier suppliers. These first- 
tier suppliers were often controlled by the OEM through equity holdings, and, 
in any case, the OEM and the first-tier  supplies typically developed a very 
close and long-standing working relation. 
1.1.2  Implications for Trade Patterns 
The different market structures in the automobile parts markets in Japan and 
the United  States had implications  for the  pattern  of  international  trade.  In 
particular, the structure of the Japanese industry made it difficult for U.S. firms 
to sell there, while the Japanese were more successful selling in the United 
States. The reasons that U.S. firms had  such small sales in Japan are often 
categorized  under the  catch-all  term structural  impediments. Four such ex- 
amples are discussed below. 
First, U.S. parts suppliers have traditionally relied on fully spelled-out blue- 
prints,  while Japanese OEMs often work closely with their suppliers on the 
design of the parts. This poses problems for U.S. parts makers who may not 
be  accustomed  to investing  in  the  necessary  engineering  and  design proce- 
dures. In particular, without technical centers in Japan, U.S. firms are often at 
a competitive disadvantage. Even U.S. firms that are accustomed to doing their 
own design often did not welcome the fact that many Japanese OEMs have 
contracts that stipulate that they have the right to provide  supplier-prepared 
drawings to other suppliers if the OEM sees fit. Japanese suppliers are more 
willing  to accept such arrangements when their long-term relations with the 
OEMs are more or less guaranteed. 15  Carwars: Trying to Make Sense of US.-Japan Trade Frictions 
Second, the Japanese system of long-term contracts may act as a structural 
impediment to trade. As the Japanese OEMs invested heavily  in their major 
suppliers in terms of technical knowledge and screening processes for reliabil- 
ity, it became more expensive for the OEMs to switch to another (possibly 
US.) supplier. Another aspect of the contracts that has trade implications con- 
cerns the degree of information sharing often required of parts suppliers. While 
U.S. parts firms are generally accustomed to disclosing only prices and quality 
standards to the U.S. OEMs, Japanese OEMs expect more complete and open 
disclosure of costs and profit margins by their suppliers. 
Third, the stringent quality guideline that the Japanese OEMs demand may 
act as a structural impediment to trade. U.S. parts suppliers faced competing 
influences when supplying domestic OEMs. While they had quality standards 
to meet, their chances of winning or renewing a contract with the Big Three 
improved if they could keep their costs very low. This trade-off, combined with 
often preannounced  inspections by the OEM, led  some parts makers (quite 
rationally)  to compromise quality. Japanese OEMs treated  the quality issue 
quite seriously. Like costs, the automaker set the objective quality level during 
the design process.  The parts  maker then  pursued  cost targets  while main- 
taining the target quality levels. Rejection rates for Japanese parts suppliers are 
roughly one in one thousand and are closer to one in ten thousand for parts 
actually delivered. This heightened level of quality is due to extensive testing 
and a high degree of factory automation. It is also expensive, and the willing- 
ness of the suppliers to undertake this expense is surely related to the long- 
term nature of contracts. 
The fourth and possibly greatest structural impediment to trade is the differ- 
ence in inventory strategies between the U.S. firms and their Japanese counter- 
parts. While the Big Three have often used inventory  stockpiling in an effort 
to achieve long production runs and to insure against equipment breakdowns, 
defective parts, and interruptions  in parts  supplies, Japanese automakers in- 
stead rely heavily on a just-in-time  (JIT) system. In turn, Japanese OEMs re- 
quire their  suppliers to  work  within the JIT system. This often means daily 
deliveries to assembly  plants. The deliveries  operate within  a synchronized 
system in which parts are recognized by bar codes indicating the model and 
reference  number of the targeted vehicle, the point of delivery, and the hour 
the vehicle  will  pass a specified  assembly  point. While some parts may  be 
delivered only once a day, others such as headlights or batteries may be deliv- 
ered every two to four hours. This system places great reliance on high parts 
quality as there are neither inventories nor time to test or inspect shipments. 
The system works well, but it not conducive to international trade in automo- 
bile parts since it requires parts suppliers to be in close geographic proximity 
to the factory. 
These structural  impediments are not  inconsistent  with  complaints often 
heard on behalf  of  U.S. parts suppliers. Common complaints include an al- 
leged unfair advantage given to Japanese suppliers (see the discussion involv- 16  James Levinsohn 
ing the importance of long-term relations above), unreasonable delays in nego- 
tiations, difficulty in obtaining information needed for bids, design standards 
that would require a massive production overhaul by U.S. parts suppliers, and 
frequent product modification requests. 
A final reason  why the U.S. did  not  sell that  many  parts to Japan  while 
Japan sold more to the U.S. throughout the 1970s and early 1980s lay with the 
exchange rate. During the 1970s, the exchange rate ranged from Y200 to Y350 
per U.S. dollar. This made Japanese components look relatively inexpensive to 
U.S. OEMs and, combined with the U.S. firms’ emphasis on price, made im- 
ported parts relatively attractive. 
All these reasons help explain the trade imbalance in automobile parts. Reg- 
ulations in Japan may also have played a role, but much of the evidence here 
is anecdotal and hard to quantify. For example, U.S. firms that attempted to 
service the Japanese after market for parts (replacement parts for existing cars) 
claimed that Japan’s strict inspection of used cars limited their ability to com- 
pete. Some of these complaints had little to do with the different structures of 
the U.S. and Japanese industries and instead seem more outrightly protection- 
ist.’ It is, however, difficult to judge how important to the parts trade these 
regulations might be. 
Prior to about 1981, the debate on the automobile parts trade was relatively 
simple even if answers were not obvious. That is, it was well understood that 
the Japanese did not buy many parts from U.S. suppliers and that this had a lot 
to do with differing industry structures. Likewise, the U.S. industry structure 
was more conducive to importing parts. 
1.1.3  New Issues in the Automobile Parts Trade Debate: The VER Years 
In May  198  1, Japan agreed to a voluntary export restraint (VER) on exports 
of  automobiles to the United  States. This led to an influx  of  direct  foreign 
investment (DFI) by Japanese automobile manufacturers. By 1985, Honda was 
producing over 150,000  cars in Marysville, Ohio, and Nissan had started oper- 
ations in Tennessee. In the years that immediately  followed, Toyota, Mazda, 
and Mitsubishi followed suit. During this same period, the weak yen began to 
strengthen relative to the dollar. In  1985, exchange rate was about Y236 per 
dollar. By 1994, it was at about Y100. Finally, by the early 1980s, the surge in 
imported automobiles from Japan that occurred in the mid- and late 1970s had 
aged such that the demand for after market parts for Japanese cars was now 
increasing. All these phenomena had important implications for the automo- 
bile parts trade between the United States and Japan. 
As noted above, Japanese OEMs frequently relied on parts suppliers with 
whom  they  had  long-established  working  relations.  When  the  OEMs then 
I. One (possibly outdated) example was a regulation that required the bulbs in both headlights 
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opened operations  in  the  United  States, they hesitated  simply to drop their 
Japanese  suppliers  and  instead  buy  solely  from US. parts  manufacturers. 
Hence, with  the influx of  DFI, some of  the parts used in production  in the 
United  States were imported from Japan, and this  led to an increase in the 
imports of parts. By definition, it takes a while for new working relations to 
become established ones. Over time, Japanese firms have indeed established 
relations  with  U.S.  firms.  (A popular  advertising  campaign  for  the  Toyota 
Camry points out the many U.S. sources of  key components of  the Camry). 
Political pressure and domestic content legislation (real and threatened) surely 
played a role in getting Japanese OEMs to purchase parts made in the United 
States, but the dramatic strengthening of the yen was also important. With the 
exchange rate at Y130 to the dollar, buying parts in dollars looked much more 
attractive than doing so when it was at Y230. Hence, while Japanese OEMs 
operating in the United States have established relations with US.  parts suppli- 
ers, this took time, and, in the interim, there was increased demand for parts 
from Japan. 
The actual accounting of the automobile parts trade also became both more 
complicated and less informative in the presence of  DFI. Many observers of 
the automobile parts trade focus on the bilateral trade balance in automobile 
parts between the United States and Japan. While perhaps a natural figure to 
focus on, this trade balance hides a great deal in an era with substantial DFI. 
To  see this, consider the following hypothetical  example. Suppose that Su- 
baru’s  new plant in Indiana bought absolutely all its parts from U.S. firms- 
admittedly an extreme example. These purchases would not directly show up 
on the  bilateral  trade  balance  since they  are domestic  transactions.  (While 
Suburu-Japan may end up buying fewer parts in Japan from its Japanese sup- 
pliers, this too is not an international transaction.) Hence, while much debate 
focuses on the bilateral trade balance, substantial changes in industry structure 
accompanying DFI may not even appear in this balance. 
Another new phenomenon in the DFI era is the confusion regarding the very 
notion of nationality. When Japanese firms used parts made in Japan in OEM 
plants located in Japan and US. firms did analogously, accounting was pretty 
simple. That simplicity is long gone, and  it has been  replaced  by  complex 
relations that make the very idea of nationality tricky. When the notion of na- 
tionality is complex, if not outright confused, discussion of trade policy is sim- 
ilarly complex. As noted above, Japanese OEMs now produce in the United 
States. Many Japanese  parts  suppliers have also  set up shop in  the  United 
States. By  1993, Japanese firms had invested in about 280 U.S. firms in the 
automobile  parts sector. Of these, about half  were joint ventures, while  the 
other half were wholly owned subsidiaries. U.S. OEMs now have production 
facilities  in  Canada  and Mexico,  although  most  production  remains  in  the 
United States. American parts manufacturers, however, have invested-heavily 
in some cases-in  Mexico. Other parts producers have entered into the joint 18  James Levinsohn 
ventures  with Japanese parts firms mentioned above. The result  is a case in 
which one American  consumer might buy a Toyota assembled in  Kentucky 
with parts from a Japanese-owned firm in Indiana, a U.S.-owned  firm in Mex- 
ico, a joint U.S.-Japan  venture located in Ohio, and a Japanese parts firm in 
Japan. Using dated nomenclature, this consumer bought a Japanese car. An- 
other consumer might buy a Ford Escort assembled in Hermosillo, Mexico, 
with parts manufactured  by  a joint U.S.-Japanese  venture in Mexico. Using 
the same dated nomenclature, this consumer bought an American car. In this 
environment, discussions of traditional trade policy, which by their very nature 
are oriented around a well-defined notion of nationality, become both confus- 
ing and confused. 
While much has changed in this era of  DFI, it remains the case that U.S. 
parts manufacturers sell very little to Japanese OEMs located in Japan. A rough 
estimate is that U.S. firms have only about  1 percent of the OEM market in 
Japan. There have been indications, however, that some U.S. firms are making 
inroads in the Japanese parts market. For example, between  1986 and 1993, 
TRW saw its annual worldwide sales to Japanese automobile companies in- 
crease sevenfold to $500 million, accounting for about 10 percent of its total 
automobile parts sales. TRW initially invested heavily in joint ventures with 
Japanese  companies  supplying  the U.S. plants  of Toyota and Nissan. Once 
TRW found this niche, it began supplying these firms back in Japan. Except 
for air bag components and some electronics, TRW makes the products for its 
Japanese OEMs in Japan, allowing them to participate effectively  in the JIT 
system. Other firms are following suit. Since 1991, GM has operated a techni- 
cal center in Japan to develop automobile parts, and its components sales in 
Japan have increased 50 percent since the center opened. In 1993, Ford ACG 
began operating  a technical center for electronic components  in Hiroshima, 
hoping to expand sales to Mazda, Nissan, and Toyota. Ford is also investing 
$50 million in a new technical center near Tokyo expected to open in late 1995. 
These changes may lead to a larger U.S. presence in the Japanese parts market, 
but history suggests that such changes take time. 
In 1992, President Bush and the U.S. automakers attempted to hurry matters 
along with Bush’s well-publicized trip to Tokyo. Although the president was 
criticized for so blatantly pursuing U.S. commercial interests, he did secure a 
promise from the Japanese to purchase more automobile parts from American 
companies. Japan pledged to purchase $19 billion  worth of  U.S. automobile 
parts in fiscal year 1994. Whether owing to this pledge or to the natural course 
of events, Japanese automakers purchased $19.9 billion worth of parts in fiscal 
year  1994 (Automotive News, 17 July  1995). Most of these purchases ($15.4 
billion)  were parts used  in the Japanese  firms’ transplant  operations  in  the 
United States. As discussed above, many of these transactions were, from an 
accounting perspective, domestic transactions between the transplant and the 
U.S. parts firm. Japan also pledged to purchase $3.6 billion worth of parts for 19  Carwars: Trying to Make Sense of  US.-Japan Trade Frictions 
export to Japan in fiscal year  1994, and it fell about $0.6 billion short of this 
pledge, again suggesting that, in the Japanese automobile parts industry, loca- 
tion matters. 
1.2  Why a Threatened Tariff on Thirteen Japanese Luxury Cars? 
In  1995, President Clinton threatened a 100 percent tariff on thirteen Japa- 
nese luxury cars. It is not obvious that any single and narrowly defined issue 
triggered this threat. Clearly, the United States was concerned about its large 
bilateral trade deficit with Japan, and automobiles and automobile parts were 
a large portion of this. But, while the Big Three publicly complained about the 
difficulty of  selling cars in Japan, most industry observers concluded that the 
Japanese market was not where the Big Three would make their mark in Asia. 
To be sure, there were significant barriers to selling cars in Japan (as claimed 
by the Big Three), but, at the same time, it was also the case that the cars that 
U.S.  firms sold were not terribly well suited to the Japanese market. As noted 
above, the relative merits of  these arguments are not addressed in this paper. 
In either case, the United States was not likely significantly to redress its bilat- 
eral trade deficit by exporting large quantities of cars to Japan. 
If it were to redress the bilateral trade deficit via the automobile industry 
trade, the United  States was left with three options. It could discourage the 
import of Japanese cars, encourage the export of  U.S. automobile parts, and 
discourage the import of Japanese automobile parts. The first and third options 
clearly  involve trade protection,  while the  second involves trade promotion. 
Pursuing  the trade promotion  option in this case, absent any sort of  threat, 
would prove difficult. As discussed in the previous section, the structural rea- 
sons behind the bilateral trade deficit in automobile parts were deep-rooted. 
The first and third option provided such a threat, but each of these also posed 
problems. 
Consider first the possibility  of  tariffs on Japanese  automobile  parts. The 
end users of these parts were in some cases American producers and in others 
transplant firms in the United States. To the extent that U.S. OEMs were using 
Japanese parts,  a tariff  would raise  their costs-an  option not greeted with 
enthusiasm.2 The other end user of imported parts was the transplant factories. 
But these firms employed U.S. workers, and raising the cost of cars produced 
by  these factories would negatively affect employment. This, too, was not an 
especially attractive option. 
This left the possibility of placing tariffs on Japanese cars. Leaving aside 
issues involving violation of the GATT and possible actions the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) might take, tariffs on Japanese cars still posed problems. 
2. From an economic viewpoint, higher costs might still impart an advantage to the US.  firms 
if their competition faced yet higher costs from the tariff. 20  James Levinsohn 
At the heart of these problems was the fact that many of the high-volume Japa- 
nese cars were in fact made in the United  States. In the data set used in the 
econometric  analysis in the next  section, cars sold by Japanese firms in the 
1994 calender year totaled 2.65 million (out of total U.S. sales of  8.782 mil- 
lion). Of these, 1.793 million  are cars whose nameplate was produced in the 
United  States. Hence, if the United States wanted to tax Japanese cars on a 
broad basis, this would involve taxing transplant production as well as imports. 
Placing a tax on transplant production, however, is at best complicated and at 
worst probably infeasible. In principle, the United States could renegotiate its 
tax treaty with Japan to effectively alter the taxes paid by the transplants. These 
taxes, however, are not directly based on sales; rather, they are based on ac- 
counting profits (i.e., they are not a per-unit production tax). Furthermore, the 
tax treaty is not industry specific, so any changes to the treaty in order to try 
to tax transplant auto production would also possibly affect all Japanese direct 
investment. Tax treaties seem too blunt a tool. 
Suppose, then, that the United States restricts potential tariffs to nameplates 
not made in the United States. Imports of  these Japanese nameplates totaled 
about 855,000 in the  1994 calendar year.'  Of  these, about one-quarter were 
models with retail prices in excess of $30,000. (There were thirteen Japanese 
models in 1994 with base prices above about $30,000.) In terms of revenue (as 
opposed to number of  cars), these Japanese luxury models accounted for al- 
most 40 percent of the value of imports. There were no Japanese cars with base 
prices  in excess of $30,000 produced  in the United  States. Japanese luxury 
cars, then, were an easily targeted and at least potentially effective group of 
products on which to place a tariff. 
Seen from a different angle, Japanese automobile producers had, by  1994, 
done a very effective job of insuring themselves against tariffs by the United 
States. While the more expensive models  were still produced  in Japan, the 
models with the largest sales were also produced in the United States. 
Faced with a bilateral trade deficit that was viewed as troubling by  politi- 
cians,'  the United States opted for threatened tariffs on a limited set of cars in 
order to promote,  among other things, an agenda of  trade promotion  in the 
automobile parts sector. Whether the threatened tariffs would actually benefit 
American  OEMs depended on the substitution patterns of  consumers. They 
would,  however,  almost certainly  hurt  Japanese  OEMs, and therein  lay  the 
threat. The next  step in analyzing the policy is to estimate the likely conse- 
quences of  a tariff on Japanese luxury cars, and this is the topic of the next 
section. 
3.  Actual imports were higher since this figure does not include imports of nameplates made in 
both the United States and Japan. That is, imports of the Honda Accord and Toyota Carny, among 
many others, are not included here. 
4. In this paper, I take it as given that the bilateral trade deficit was a topic of  concern. From an 
economic viewpoint, this is not obviously sensible, but it seemed to constitute the political reality 
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1.3  The Threatened Tariffs, Their Estimated Consequences, and the 
Resulting Trade Promotion 
I .3.1  Policy Details 
On 16 May  1995, President Clinton announced  100 percent tariffs on thir- 
teen Japanese luxury cars to go into place four days later, with the sanctions 
becoming final on 28 June. This schedule gave Clinton and his trade represen- 
tative, Mickey Kantor, a few weeks to see if brinksmanship might prove a suc- 
cessful strategy for trade promotion. 
The details of the announced tax involved a 100 percent tariff on the landed 
cost  of  the  following  thirteen  models:  the  Lexus  (Toyota) LS400,  SC400, 
GS300, SC300, and ES300; the Infiniti (Nissan) Q45, 530, and 130; the Acura 
(Honda) Legend and 3.2TL; the Mazda 929 and Millenia; and the Mitsubishi 
Diamante. Of these models, the Millenia had the lowest base price ($26,435), 
while the LS400 was the most expensive ($51,680).  None of these cars sold in 
especially large quantities, although the Legend and the ES300 were the most 
popular by a factor of almost two. Slightly under 40,000 of each sold in 1994. 
This compares with sales of about 365,000 for the Honda Accord alone. 
Although the news media treated the tariff as if it would simply double the 
price consumers paid, this was simplistic and incorrect. The tariff would apply 
to the price that obtained in equilibrium after the tariff was imposed, and there 
is no reason to believe that the equilibrium price would be invariant to a tariff. 
Also, the  100 percent  figure referred to the landed price, not the list price. 
What  this  figure translates to as a percentage  of  list price vanes by  model, 
but  the leading trade publication, Automotive News, reported the tariff, as a 
percentage of list price, to be about 65 percent in the case of the Lexus LS400. 
For example, the landed value of this particular model was estimated to be 
$33,280, while the dealer invoice was about $42,000, and the list price was 
$5 1  ,680.5 In the analysis in this paper, an ad valorem tariff  of  65 percent is 
used, although this figure is admittedly approximate and in reality would vary 
by model. 
1.3.2  Modeling the Policy 
In order to model the equilibrium that would obtain in the presence of the 
proposed tariff, one must model both  consumer behavior  and firm behavior. 
The basic setup is taken from Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995a). For pur- 
poses of brevity, an intuitive discussion of these methods is given here, and the 
interested  reader  is referred  to  Berry,  Levinsohn,  and  Pakes  (1995a)  for  a 
(much!) more in-depth discussion. 
The model estimated has two parts-a  utility-based consumer framework 
5.  Conwmers also pay a 10 percent luxury tax on the portion of the price above $32,000. 22  James Levinsohn 
on the demand side and a cost-function-based  model of a multiproduct oligop- 
olistic firm on the supply side. Each is discussed in turn. 
Following a strategy developed by Pakes (1986), demand in this model is 
computed by  aggregating over simulated heterogeneous consumers. Consum- 
ers’ utility  functions are assumed to have the same functional form, but the 
parameters  of the function vary across the population.  This is because  con- 
sumer tastes vary throughout the population. The distribution of tastes is one 
of the primitives that is estimated.  I assume that tastes for product attributes 
such as horsepower, weight, and size are normally distributed  in the popula- 
tion. The estimation procedure estimates the mean and variance of these nor- 
mal distributions. Price is treated a bit differently than other product attributes. 
I assume that sensitivity to price is inversely proportional to income and that it 
is income that  varies throughout  the population.  Rather  than estimating the 
distribution of income as, say, the distribution of taste for horsepower is esti- 
mated, the empirical distribution  of incorne is used. There is also a random 
idiosyncratic component to utility. A simulated consumer, then, consists of  a 
draw from each of the distributions of tastes and income as well as a draw from 
the distribution of idiosyncratic terms. This simulated consumer then chooses 
either to buy a car or to spend nothing  and instead buy the “outside good.” 
The utility  of the outside good is normalized to zero, and its presence allows 
substitution  out of the automobile market. Conditional on this set of  draws, 
one can then compute which product gives this simulated consumer the great- 
est utility. One can imagine simulating about 90 million consumers (the num- 
ber of households in the United States), hence effectively simulating the de- 
mand for automobiles. One would keep track of the most preferred product of 
each of these consumers and aggregate up to compute market shares. Loosely 
speaking, the objective of the estimation procedure  is to find the means and 
variances of the underlying distribution of tastes that come as close as possible 
to fitting the observed market shares. 
The description given above ignores many important aspects of  the demand 
side of the model. These include econometric issues such as allowing for prod- 
uct characteristics that are unobserved by the econometrician but observed by 
the consumer, the probable correlation of these unobserved characteristics with 
price and the econometric endogeneity thus induced, and sampling techniques 
(in particular, importance sampling). The role of the distribution of idiosyn- 
cratic tastes and how this interacts with ensuing policy analysis are also mostly 
omitted. These issues are discussed in BLP. 
On the supply side of the model, each product is assumed to be produced 
with constant returns to scale, and a (log) marginal cost function is estimated 
for each product. Marginal cost is assumed to depend on attributes of the prod- 
uct as well as cost shifters such as wages and exchange rates (when applicable). 
The firms are modeled as multiproduct oligopolists who set prices in a Nash 
fashion (i.e., Bertrand competition). That is, firms set prices to maximize firm- 
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prices that maximize profits, firms make use of information on demand elastic- 
ities.  In a no-tax  equilibrium, price  is composed of  marginal  cost  plus  the 
markup. Since the demand system is not a constant elasticity system. markups 
will depend on quantities demanded (i.e., demand elasticities vary along the 
demand schedule). The demand and pricing sides of the model are simultane- 
ous because demand depends on prices and the prices set by  the firms depend 
on quantity demanded. Put another way, a firm’s first-order conditions for opti- 
mal prices depend on demand elasticities, and the underlying (indirect) utility 
function itself depends on the prices that firms charge. The pricing and utility 
sides of the model are estimated simultaneously. 
Modeling the 100 percent tax involves changing the firm’s first-order condi- 
tion and recomputing an equilibrium under the assumption that firms still max- 
imize profits, that  consumers still  maximize  utility, but  that  there  is  now  a 
wedge between the price consumers pay and the price firms receive for a subset 
of products.h In this case, that wedge is assumed to be an ad valorem tax of 65 
percent of the producer price that obtains in the new equilibrium. 
1.3.3  Data and Results 
The model  is estimated using  twenty  years  of  annual  data from  1975 to 
1994.’ Product attributes entering the utility function of consumers are a con- 
stant. the ratio of horsepower to weight, size (defined as length times width of 
the car. a dummy variable for whether the base mode! of the car had air condi- 
tioning as standard, and a dummy variable if it was made by a non-U.S. based 
company (i.e. foreign). Recall that for each of these attributes, the mean of the 
distribution of tastes for the attribute as well as the variance of this distribution 
is estimated. A parameter on the price term is also estimated. Prices are given 
in constant terms and the list price is used. For a discussion of the issues sur- 
rounding  the use  of  list  versus  transaction  price,  see Berry, Levinsohn, and 
Pakes (1995b). 
On the cost side, marginal cost shifters are a constant, the logs of horsepower 
divided by  weight, size, the lagged exchange rate, wages, a dummy variable 
for air conditioning as standard, a trend term, dummy variables for Japan and 
Europe, and these dummy variables interacted with the trend term. 
Table 1.2 gives the estimated parameters of the primitives of the model. The 
top panel gives the means of the distribution of tastes for the product attributes 
entering the demand side. The second panel gives the estimated standard devia- 
tions of these distributions. A large and precisely estimated standard deviation 
(u)  may be interpreted as capturing heterogeneity in the population concerning 
how the attribute contributes to utility. A demand side attribute in this model 
6. An additional assumption is that the set of  products that tirms produce does not change. Just 
7. The data set is available on request as a MIME attachment to email. Send requests to JamesL 
how  reasonable this assumption may be is discussed below. 
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Table 1.2  Estimated Parameters of the Demand and Pricing Equations: 
2,470 Observations 

















.6  I1 
Standard deviations (up’s): 
Constant  2.191  1.445 
HP/weight  3.320  1.688 
Size  1.295  .907 
Air  ,139  .791 
Foreign  5.174  ,579 
( YhJ)  46.728  5.336 
Constant  -2.172  .686 
In(  HP/weight)  ,564  ,072 
In(size)  1.190  ,122 
Air  ,482  ,040 
Trend  -  .008  ,006 
Japan  -  1.299  1.133 
Euro  3.363  ,493 
Euro  X trend  -.034  ,006 
lag Me-rate)  -  ,028  .O 17 
Term on price (a): 
Cost-side parameters: 
Japan X trend  .O 16  ,012 
In(wage)  ,895  ,159 
Note; HP = horsepower; e-rate = exchange rate. 
is considered to be important  if  either its mean  or its standard  deviation  is 
precisely different from zero. That is the case with all automobile attributes in 
this specification.  Finally, although the mean  of the distribution  of taste for 
foreign cars is negative, it turns out that the elasticity of demand with respect 
to this dummy variable is indeed positive. This is because most of the consum- 
ers who place a negative value on foreign cars do not in fact buy a car. 
The term on price is precisely estimated. Its implications for elasticities and 
hence markups are discussed below. All 2,470 products, however, face elastic 
demand at the estimated parameters. 
Most marginal cost shifters are precisely estimated. The only estimated co- 
efficients not significantly different from zero are those on the general trend, 
those on the lagged exchange rate, and those on the Japan dummy and interac- 
tion  variables. All product  attributes  enter marginal cost positively  and pre- 
cisely. 
Perhaps the easiest way to interpret the reasonableness of the estimated coef- 25  Carwars: Trying to Make Sense of U.S.-Japan Trade Frictions 
Table 1.3  A Sample from 1994 of Estimated Price-Marginal Cost Markups of 
(Potentially) Taxed Models, Based on Table 1.1 Estimates 
Markup 6) 
Price ($)  (p  -  MC1  Markup 

















































Norr: MC = marginal cost 
ficients is to examine the markups that they imply since markups imply infor- 
mation about both marginal costs and underlying demand elasticities. The list 
price (in  1994 dollars) as well as the markup of  twelve  of  the thirteen cars 
subject to the proposed tariff are given in table 1.3. One of the cars that would 
have been subject to the tax, the Infiniti 130, was not sold in 1994. Another of 
the cars, the Acura 3.2TL, was also not sold, but this car is basically a rebadged 
Acura Vigor, so the Vigor is used as a proxy for the 3.2TL. In table 1.3, one 
sees that the  markups vary from about 30 percent of list price to about 38 
percent. The more expensive models tend to have the higher percentage mark- 
ups, suggesting that these models have relatively less elastic demand. 
The estimates in table 1.2 above completely specify the underlying distribu- 
tion of tastes in the population on the demand side of the model and the firm’s 
first-order condition on the cost side. The model is an equilibrium model of 
the automobile market. Households are maximizing utility, while firms are si- 
multaneously maximizing profits. Modeling the threatened tariff involves per- 
turbing this equilibrium by altering the first-order conditions for the firms that 
produce the models subject to the tariff. One then recomputes the prices and 
quantities for which the new first-order conditions hold. 
The main difference between the tariff and the no-tariff equilibria is that the 
tariff introduces a wedge between the price consumers pay and the price the 
firms receive. This wedge is taken  to be 65 percent  of  the new equilibrium 
(post-tariff) producer price.  Table  1.4 lists  the  twelve  models targeted  with 
tariffs that were sold in 1994. The first column lists the  1994 base model list 
price, while the second column lists the producer price that would obtain in 
the presence of the 65 percent tariff. These figures are surprising to those used 26  James Levinsohn 
Table 1.4  Prices with Implementation of the Threatened Tariff, Based on 
Table 1.1 Estimates 
Price ($)  Producer Price ($)  Consumer Price ($) 

















































to thinlung about taxes in models of perfect competition with a representative 
consumer. In those models, the tax burden is shared between the consumers 
and the firm, with burdens distributed according to relative elasticities. Those 
models, however, do not characterize  the U.S. automobile  market very well. 
The estimates of the producer price that would obtain with a 65 percent tariff 
show remarkably little price change as a result of the imposition of the tariff. 
The price received by producers falls in the cases of nine of the twelve models, 
although these declines are not large. The largest decline (relative to the no- 
tax price) is only about 9 percent. In three cases, the price received by produc- 
ers actually rises. What is going on here? 
There are three intertwined  explanations.  First, in models in which goods 
are strategic complements, a tax will tend to exert an upward influence on the 
price received by the producer. In a Bertrand model with linear demands, all 
goods are strategic complements. While the equilibrium concept assumed here 
is Bertrand, demand is not linear. It turns out that about half the product pairs 
are strategic complements. Hence, in these cases, a tariff shifts reaction func- 
tions out and tends to increase equilibrium prices. Whether the producer price 
will increase so much as to result in a producer price higher than the no-tariff 
price is an empirical issue. Second, in this model, consumers are heteroge- 
neous. When the tariff is applied to some products, the consumers who substi- 
tute away from those products are the price-sensitive consumers. The consum- 
ers who continue to buy the car at the post-tariff  price are those  who have 
relatively inelastic demand for the taxed product. After the tariff, then, the firm 
faces a more inelastic demand for its product, and this will tend to move prices 
higher. Again, the magnitude of this influence is an empirical matter. Third, 
and this is closely related  to the second factor, the idiosyncratic  term in the 
utility function is assumed to have an extreme value (“logit”) distribution. An 27  Carwars: Trying to Make Sense of US.-Japan Trade Frictions 
empirical implication of this is that, at any price, there will be some consumers 
whose  idiosyncratic  tastes are such that a particular product  is still bought. 
This phenomenon is not unique to the logit assumption. If  the idiosyncratic 
term were normally distributed (“probit”), there would still be the occasional 
draw from the tail of the distribution. These draws from the tails of the un- 
bounded distributions will give rise to at least some demand for every product 
at any price. This phenomenon will also tend to exert an upward influence on 
price. The relative importance of this (as well as ways around the problem) is 
the topic of continuing research. In summary, producer prices tend to fall a 
small amount, but this is not uniform across products. 
With relatively unchanged producer prices, consumer prices with the tariff 
rise substantially. These prices are given in the last column of  table 1.4. Most 
prices rise by about 60 percent. Hence, the price of the top-of-the-line  Lexus 
sedan rises from $5 1,200 to over $76,000. The price of the top-of-the-line In- 
finiti Q45 also exceeds $75,000.  An important cautionary note is due here. The 
figures in table  1.4 assume that  the firms continue to play  a static Bertrand 
game and  maximize prices  accordingly.  If  news  reports  following  the  an- 
nouncement of  the threatened tariffs are to be believed, this is not a realistic 
assumption. Soon after the tariffs were announced, for example, Toyota stated 
that it would not change the price of the cars subject to the tariff. This implies 
that  Toyota was  prepared  to absorb the $20,000-$30,000  tariff. As a long- 
run  strategy, this  probably  could  not  be sustained. As a  short-run  strategy, 
it is somewhat puzzling,  although presumably  it helped  placate their dealer 
network. 
Although the producer prices of the taxed models did not increase substan- 
tially  with the tax, the ensuing high consumer prices would have exacted  a 
heavy toll on sales and profits. Table 1.5 addresses these issues. The first col- 
umn gives the sales that actually occurred in the 1994 calendar year. Note that 
none of the models threatened with tariffs have very large sales. For purposes 
of comparison, almost 370,000 Honda Accords were sold during this period, 
and the corresponding number of the Ford Taurus was almost 400,000. Of the 
models listed in table 1.5, the least expensive Lexus (the ES300) had the high- 
est sales, and these totaled just over 39,000. The second column in table  1.5 
lists the variable profits associated with each model. This is just the producer 
price minus marginal cost (the markup) times sales. These numbers should be 
treated with some caution as it is not completely clear what constitutes variable 
profits in an industry with such huge fixed costs. Still, they provide a baseline 
for comparison. These figures suggest that, while sales are not huge, profits of 
some of  these models are indeed quite substantial. The estimates imply that 
the Acura legend, the Lexus ES300, and the Lexus LS400 each earned a bit 
more than $400 million for their respective parent firms. These large numbers 
are due to the significant markups on these models. 
When the tariff  was threatened, car dealers that  sold the affected  models 
claimed that  sales would fall drastically  should the tariff  go into effect. My 28  James Levinsohn 
Table 1.5  Sales and Profits with Implementation of the Threatened Tariff, 
Based on Table 1.1 Estimates (sales are in 1,000s; profits are 
in $1,000,000) 
Sales  Profit  Sales  Profit 





























































estimates suggest that the dealers were right on target. With the imposition of 
the tariff, sales plummet.  Sales of the taxed models fall, in aggregate, from 
about 218,000 to just over 60,000. Although  the decline in  sales varies  by 
model, most models see their sales fall around 75 percent. For example, Leg- 
end sales fall from 35,706 to 9,836, while those of the newly launched Mazda 
Millenia  fall  from  24,423  to  5,296.  Hence,  while  producer  prices  remain 
mostly  unchanged,  the correspondingly high consumer prices  drive demand 
way  down. Profits accordingly fall. Again defined as the markup times sales, 
profits fall drastically. Declines are typically on the order of 75 percent. For 
example, profits from the Lexus LS400 fall from $436 million to $107 million. 
Profits from half the models subject to the tariff fall below $50 million, and 
this raises the issue of whether these models will survive. 
The new car industry is marked by tremendous fixed costs. If variable profits 
are too low, a model will  not prove profitable  to develop. With  this sort of 
calculus in mind, it seems probable that, while the taxed models will not disap- 
pear immediately, the firms producing them may decide to discontinue some 
models when model change time comes. Making firm predictions would re- 
quire detailed information on fixed costs, and such information is not readily 
available. Nonetheless, the issue of whether, say, Nissan will continue with its 
Infiniti line when the time comes for remodeling or whether they will develop 
new models when profits are so low is real. 
Table  1.5 is useful for doomsayers who claimed that the proposed tariffs 
would really  hurt the Japanese  firms. That table, however, does not  put the 
figures into any sort of firm-level perspective. The broader issue is whether the 
parent  firms would be  substantively  hurt by  the proposed tariffs. One might 
imagine that consumers who did not buy a Lexus might instead buy a top-of- 29  Carwars: Trying to Make Sense of U.S.-Japan Trade Frictions 
Table 1.6  Firm Profits by Country of Origin (in $million), Based on 
Table 1.1 Estimates 
Profits without Tariff  Profits with Tariff 
Total Japanese profits  12,165.861  10,638.131 
Total U.S.  profits  34,572.511  34,921.828 
Total European profits  3,852.204  44,443.364 
the-line Camry or Avalon (both Toyotas), hence diminishing the tariff’s effect 
on Toyota. Another issue not addressed in the previous tables is who, if anyone, 
gains from these tariffs. It was widely speculated that the real beneficiaries of 
the proposed tariffs would be, not American firms, but rather European firms. 
This would be true if the consumers who substituted away from the taxed prod- 
ucts instead bought the typically upscale European products. 
Table 1.6 begins to address these issues. Rather than looking at one product 
at a time, the table looks at profits at a much more aggregate level. This table 
puts the likely effect of  the threatened  tariff  in  a broader context. Japanese 
profits fall by about $1.5 billion, which represents a decline of approximately 
12.5 percent. Whether this is a large decline depends on one’s perspective. For 
a 100 percent tariff, one might argue that a 12.5 percent decline in profits is 
not that  big. On the other hand, for a tariff  as narrowly  targeted as the one 
under consideration, a 12.5 percent overall decline might seem large. In any 
case, the proposed tariff would  clearly hurt the Japanese firms. Who gains? 
The figures in table  1.6 suggest that the real winner would be the European 
firms. European profits increase by about 15 percent. U.S. profits are basically 
unaffected. Consumers who switch away from the targeted high-end Japanese 
cars tend to switch to other Japanese cars and European cars. According to my 
estimates, U.S. firms just do not win many new customers with the proposed 
tariffs. Furthermore, some of those customers who do switch to domestic cars 
are among the more price sensitive, and this works toward lowering markups. 
1.3.4  Actual Outcomes 
The previous section estimated what would have happened had the tariffs 
been put permanently  into place. In fact, on 28 June 1995, about six weeks 
after the tariffs were first announced, they were withdrawn. This is consistent 
with the decline in Japanese profits in table  1.6, although political concerns 
were surely important. 
The trade pact announced on 28 June affected many players in the US.- 
Japan automobile market-U.S.  parts producers, Japanese OEMs, U.S. OEMs, 
as well as retail dealerships. The effect of the agreement on each is discussed 
in turn. 
The biggest winners of the trade pact were U.S. parts manufacturers. The 
net effect of the pact for parts makers is estimated to be a $9 billion increase 30  James Levinsohn 
in Japanese purchases of parts from North American suppliers by  1992L8  While 
some increase surely would have occurred naturally, the $9 billion figure repre- 
sents almost a 50 percent increase in parts purchases. The pledge to purchase 
more American parts bears much resemblance to a similar pledge obtained by 
President Bush in  1992. Recall that that agreement entailed a pledge to in- 
crease parts purchases by about $8.5 billion. That pledge was met. There are, 
however, reasons to suspect that it will be harder to meet the pledged increase 
this time. When the previous pledge was announced, several Japanese OEMs 
had  plans to build  new  transplant  factories, the Japanese  market  share was 
increasing annually, and the yen was falling rather dramatically. All these fac- 
tors facilitated meeting  the  earlier pledge. Now, only Toyota remains  in  an 
expansion mode in the United Sates, as other firms do not have major expan- 
sion projects in the works.9 Japanese market share seems to be leveling off, 
and few observers expect the yen to continue to decline at the rate seen from 
1991 to 1995. All this suggests that meeting the pledge may be more difficult 
this time around. On the other hand, as discussed in section  1.1 above, U.S. 
parts manufacturers seem to be adapting to working with Japanese OEMs, and 
this process will continue. 
The specific parts of the trade pact dealing with increased parts purchases 
include commitments from Japan’s Big Five (Toyota, Honda, Mazda, Mitsubi- 
shi, and Nissan) to buy $6.75 billion more in parts from U.S. suppliers, meet 
NAFTA local content standards by  1998, increase transplant production from 
2.1 million  in  1994 to 2.65 million in  1998, and import $6 billion  worth of 
foreign parts by  1997, $2 billion of  which will come from the United States. 
Japan also agreed to a series of  administrative changes that are expected to 
contribute to opening up Japan’s market for replacement parts. These changes 
include  an  end  to  inspections  not  requiring  welds  or  rivets  (expect  some 
regulation-induced technological progress in car repair!); eased standards for 
garages, which is expected to increase competition and hence increase demand 
for U.S.-made parts; a promise to further review the restrictive list of parts that 
can be replaced  only by certified garages; removing  shock absorbers, struts, 
power steering, and trailer hitches from the list; a promise to respond within 
thirty days to U.S. requests to remove a part from the list; and permitting a new 
class of garages that will specialize in brakes, transmissions, and mufflers. 
Japanese OEMs were mostly affected by the parts pledges discussed above. 
As noted, these pledges may be difficult to fulfill. Japanese OEMs’ production 
and sales were also mildly affected by the threat of sanctions. Lexus decreased 
June production by about five thousand units, although US.-bound production 
increased soon afterward. Infiniti also saw June production fall, only for that 
fall to be made up in July. Acura delayed the launch of its 3.2TL model by 
8. Much of this section is drawn from reporting in Automotive News (3  July 1995). 
9. Honda is also expanding, but these plans had been in progress long before the announced 
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two months owing to the sanctions. Mazda production had been cut before the 
sanctions were put into place and was not  really  affected by  the  sanctions, 
while Mitsubishi delayed its 1996 Diamante by six to eight weeks. In no case 
did the  sanctions and resulting  decrease  in production result in unexpected 
shortages. 
U.S. OEMs benefited mostly from potentially increased access to the Japa- 
nese market. The details suggest that, relative to the parts deal, this is pretty 
minor.  For  example,  Ministry  of  International  Trade  and  Industry  (MITI) 
agrees to write all Japanese automobile dealers to tell them that they are free 
to sell foreign vehicles and to announce that pressure (from Japanese OEMs) 
not  to sell  such vehicles  could violate Japan's  competition  laws. Japan  also 
agrees to survey dealers for interest in selling foreign cars and pass the survey 
results on to U.S. OEMs.l0 
Car dealers in the United States that carried the models threatened with the 
tariffs were also big winners from the trade pact in the sense that they avoided 
a potential disaster. They are not big winners in the sense that they are left 
clearly better off than they were prior to the entire trade dispute. Had the tariffs 
been put into place, however, the estimates reported in the previous  section 
suggest that  sales would  have plummeted  and new  models might  not have 
been forthcoming. 
What about enforcement and monitoring of  the trade pact'? The pact does 
not contain specific quotas, other numerical targets, or timetables for gauging 
progress.  Nor are  specific sanctions mentioned  should pledges  go unfilled. 
Rather, the United States and Japan  agree to work to speed progress should 
matters move too slowly. In sum, monitoring and enforcement are minimal. It 
remains to be seen how important this might be. 
1.4  Conclusions 
The story of recent trade frictions between the United  States and Japan in 
the automobile parts market goes as follows. Initially, there was not much trade 
as Japanese cars were made in Japan with mostly Japanese parts and the same 
was mostly true of North American cars. Most of what trade did exist consisted 
of U.S. imports of Japanese parts. U.S. OEMs had a very different relation with 
their parts suppliers than did Japanese OEMs. These differences contributed to 
a growing bilateral trade deficit in auto parts. In an effort to address this deficit, 
the L1.S.  threatened tariffs on thirteen Japanese cars. This might seem like a 
very indirect way to address the parts trade, but more direct avenues were either 
ineffective or too costly. The threatened tariffs would have resulted in drasti- 
cally reduced sales of the thirteen models, and Japanese profits in total would 
have fallen around 12.5 percent, while the European firms would have captured 
10. Estimates auggest that these changes will result in about two hundred more outlets for U.S. 
cars in Japan by  1997. It is not clear. however, on what this estimate is based. 32  James Levinsohn 
many of the lost Japanese sales. U.S. firms would have been pretty much unaf- 
fected by the tariffs. An unenforced trade pact resulted in which Japan agreed 
to buy substantially more U.S. parts and the United States agreed to drop the 
threatened tariffs. The pact is one of trade promotion, although it resulted from 
a threat of trade protection. As noted at the outset, the line between trade pro- 
motion and trade protection is thin indeed. 
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